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The 2010/2013 crisis laid bare the structural fragilities of the Economic and Monetary Union, 
a monetary area made up of multiple economies with very different institutional structures and 
growth regimes. The crisis and the European Union’s subsequent response, which focused on the 
correction of imbalances in southern economies, have had a profound impact on all European 
economies, particularly undermining southern economies’ convergence to the level of 
development of northern countries. This scenario has brought new life to the debate on the reform 
of economic governance of the Eurozone, and there have already emerged many propositions that, 
if fulfilled, will have an important impact on the economies of the euro area.  
This paper aims at comparing the structural evolution of the Portuguese economy, a typical 
southern European peripheral economy, with that of Germany, the Economic and Monetary 
Union’s model economy, using the debate on the new reform of the Eurozone as a backdrop. We 
will thus analyze a set of variables in Portugal and in Germany, before and after the crisis, in order 
to assess whether the Portuguese economy has become closer to the German model regarding its 
institutional structure and growth regime, and what that means for the sustainability of the 
Eurozone. The analysis will be based on the Varieties of Capitalism framework and the theory of 
growth regimes. 
The paper is organized as follows. The theoretical framework is presented in section 2, 
focusing on the connections between the two theories, followed by a brief discussion of the new 
reform of the Eurozone. Section 3 presents the methods used and section 4 presents some 
empirical results of the analysis of the evolution of a set of variables relevant in the context of the 
theoretical framework. Real convergence and sectoral specialization are also analyzed in this 
section. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. Varieties of Capitalism 
The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) theory provides a framework that divides national political 
economies into three different typologies according to their structure: coordinated market 




These three types of economies have different institutional economic structures, leading them to 
choose different macroeconomic policies (Fioretos, 2001; Hall & Soskice, 2001). 
The typical CME is Germany, where the main actors in industrial relations are strong and 
centralized producers’ associations and trade unions, both seeking to control wage growth and 
inflation in order to maintain competitiveness. This allows for the existence of coordinated wage 
bargaining that arises in the industrial exporter sector and spreads to the sectors that are sheltered 
from international competition (eg. the public and the non-tradeable goods sectors) (Hassel, 
2014). The existence of coordinated wage bargaining, along with an advanced welfare state and 
robust labor protection, encourages companies and workers to engage in vocational training, 
which allows workers to develop very specific skills. The labor market therefore favors 
incremental innovation (that is gradually put in place and aims at long-term results). This means 
that CMEs usually specialize in the production of quality differentiated goods that are not very 
dependent on price competitiveness, as is the case of machinery, high precision tools, transport 
equipment, motors, etc. (Hall & Soskice, 2001).   
The big international financial centers (e.g. the USA and the UK) are in turn the classical 
examples of LMEs, in almost everything opposite to CMEs. These economies feature highly 
flexible labor markets, with weak trade unions and labor protection. Therefore, and although there 
is no coordinated wage bargaining like in CMEs, the flexibility of the labor market and the 
weakness of trade unions allow for low inflation and unit labor costs (ULCs) (Hall, 2018). Having 
dynamic and flexible capital markets, these countries usually specialize in radical innovation, 
producing semiconductors, high technology products, telecommunications, pharmaceutical 
products, etc. (Hall & Soskice, 2001). 
Lastly, in an intermediate position between CMEs and LMEs are the MMEs of southern 
Europe, Portugal being one of them. MMEs are mostly made up of relatively recent democracies, 
where the state plays a relevant role in economic activity and in managing industrial relations, 
acting as a compensator for the inefficiencies of this less “pure” type of capitalism (Molina & 
Rhodes, 2007; Kuokstis, 2015). Given the fact that trade unions are usually relatively strong but 




but instead there are occasional short-term social pacts (Hassel, 2014). These countries 
traditionally specialize in low-cost goods that are intensive in low-skilled labor and thus very 
dependent on price competitiveness (Costa, 2012). Since the labor market is less flexible than in 
LMEs, but there is no wage negotiation focused on competitiveness like in CMEs, MMEs are 
prone to high levels of inflation, that they made up for with currency devaluation before the 
introduction of the euro (Hall, 2018). 
2.2. Growth regimes 
The growth regimes literature, very close to the post-Keynesian school of thought, gained 
notoriety in the aftermath of the 2010/2013 crisis, as it is frequently used to explain the origins of 
the crisis and the fragilities in the architecture of the euro. There are a great variety of terms used 
to refer to the different growth regimes, but the most common distinction is between export-led 
and demand-led regimes. 
As the name suggests, a country with an export-led growth regime usually has a positive 
current account, with the biggest contribution to GDP coming from exports. This means that these 
countries are highly dependent on the dynamics of global demand, that is, demand generated by 
demand-led countries (Hein, 2019). Hein & Mundt (2013) also identify a weak export-led type of 
growth, featuring a positive current account but a negative contribution of net exports to GDP 
growth, owing to growing domestic demand or a decrease in net exports over time and thus 
reflecting a decrease in competitiveness.  
On the other hand, the definition of a demand-led regime is somewhat more complicated 
since the domestic demand that fuels growth can have different sources. Although demand can be 
generated by wage growth, the most common model, and the one found in southern Europe before 
the euro crisis, is demand fueled by debt, arising from financialization and easy access to credit. 
This regime is highly unstable and is characterized by a positive contribution of domestic demand 
to GDP growth, while the current account usually runs a deficit (Hein, 2019). 
The European Union can thus be divided into an export-led core, consisting of Germany 
and other northern European countries (Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, the Nordic countries) and 




of southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) (Gambarotto & Solari, 2015; Stockhammer 
& Kohler, 2019). These two growth models are highly interdependent and unstable.  
2.3. Varieties of Capitalism and Growth Regimes 
The connections between the two frameworks described above have been explored by 
post-Keynesian authors as well as by authors of the VoC school. Growth regimes and VoC are 
closely linked, because a given institutional infrastructure tends to favor and even reinforce a 
specific growth regime (Regan, 2015; Hall, 2018; Perez & Matsaganis, 2018). 
Due to its institutional structure, which favors coordinated wage bargaining to restrain 
wage growth and the existence of vocational training to increase workers’ skills, northern 
Europe’s CMEs are usually export-led. These countries’ institutional structure also favors 
conservative fiscal policy and the existence of an independent Central Bank, which enforces 
restrictive monetary policy (Hope & Soskice, 2016). This also allows these countries to contain 
inflation and maintain competitiveness in the export sector, leading to the accumulation of current 
account surpluses  (Hancké, 2013; Hall, 2018). 
On the other hand, both LMEs and MMEs are usually demand-led, since they lack the 
necessary institutional structure to restrain wages and increase workers’ skills. Fiscal and 
monetary policies in these countries tend to be expansionary in order to support domestic demand, 
leading to current account deficits  (Hancké, 2013; Hall, 2018). The situation tends to be more 
problematic in the MMEs of southern Europe, where trade unions are decentralized but more 
powerful than in LMEs, especially those in the sheltered sector. Therefore, these economies have 
trouble containing rising ULCs and, therefore, inflation arising in the sheltered sector, leading to 
an increase in domestic demand and competitiveness problems that were solved using currency 
devaluation before the introduction of the euro (Hall, 2012; Hassel, 2014; Johnston et al, 2014). 
2.3.1. Varieties of Capitalism and Growth Regimes in the Eurozone 
Bringing together many economies with very different institutional structures, the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was built in the image of German ordoliberalism, focusing 
on controlling inflation and turning Germany into the model economy of the Eurozone (EZ)  




countries with very different institutional structures and growth models in the same monetary area 
and the European Union’s (EU) attempt to promote economic convergence have thus favored the 
export-led growth models of CMEs and created a highly unstable scenario  (Baccaro & Pontussen, 
2016; Johnston & Regan, 2018). 
First, by eliminating the possibility of currency devaluation for members of the EZ, the 
EMU has reinforced the competitiveness of CMEs (Iversen et al, 2016). Furthermore, the 
European Central Bank’s (ECB) main role is to control inflation, a principle that is completely in 
line with German ordoliberalism and the export-led growth model (Fioretos, 2001).  The 
competitiveness of Southern countries has in turn suffered not only with the rise of ULCs (which 
they now can’t make up for with currency devaluation), but also with competition coming from 
China and eastern Europe since the early 2000s. This is problematic because these countries have 
export structures very similar to that of southern Europe, specializing in the production of low-
cost goods that are very dependent on price competitiveness (Simonazzi et al, 2013; Nölke, 2016; 
Dooley, 2018). 
Lastly, financialization also contributed to the worsening of instability in the EZ. With 
the disappearance of foreign currency risk in the EMU, southern countries saw their interest rates 
decrease, making access to credit easier and fueling domestic demand  (Scharpf, 2011; Parker & 
Tsarouhas, 2018). However, most of that credit was not channeled to productive activities, but 
instead to the non-tradeable goods sector, characterized by low productivity but quick profit, as 
is the case of the construction and real estate sectors (Rodrigues & Reis, 2012). This explains why 
there was a huge capital flow from the center to the periphery in the 2000s, with northern surpluses 
fueling southern deficits  (Stockhammer, 2011; Parker & Tsarouhas, 2018). 
CMEs and MMEs have an almost symbiotic relationship, with the performance of 
northern Europe’s export-led countries being highly dependent on demand generated in the South, 
since the EZ is an almost closed economy  (Stockhammer, 2011; Stockhammer, 2016; Johnston 
& Regan, 2018). Because demand in MMEs is based on the indebtedness of families, and because 
the members of the EZ can’t use the exchange rate to make up for losses in competitiveness, a 




Elsässer, 2016). Monetary integration has thus turned the coexistence of different varieties of 
capitalism into something very unstable. 
2.3.2. The crisis and the post-crisis period 
The euro crisis arose due to the frailties inherent to the architecture of the EMU, in the 
aftermath of the 2008/09 crisis, laying bare the unstable nature of the euro. Given the huge impact 
of the crisis and its management by the EU on European economies, especially in southern 
Europe, it is only natural that many authors have already tried to analyze the crisis, its causes and 
consequences.  
The VoC literature identifies the competitiveness problems that arose in the South as the 
main cause of the crisis, those problems being closely related to these countries’ structural 
inability to control ULCs and made worse by wage restraint in CMEs (Hancké, 2013; Johnston et 
al, 2014; Kuokstis, 2015). On the other hand, the post-Keynesian school emphasizes the instability 
resulting from financialization and private indebtedness in the South, financed by northern 
surpluses and fueled by monetary integration  (Scharpf, 2011; Hein, 2019; Stockhammer & 
Kohler, 2019). However, there are now more and more contributions that look at these two factors 
together (Stockhammer, 2011; Hassel, 2014; Nölke, 2016). 
The EU’s response to the crisis focused mainly on the correction of excessive deficits of 
the current account that southern economies had accumulated in the years before, naming those 
countries’ “irresponsibility” as the main cause of the crisis  (Stockhammer, 2011; Gambarotto & 
Solari, 2015). Deprived of the possibility of currency devaluation to enhance competitiveness and 
promote exports, southern countries were forced to follow a strategy of internal devaluation and 
flexibilization of the labor market, in order to decrease ULCs and domestic demand (Steinberg & 
Vermeiren, 2016; Parker & Tsarouhas, 2018). This means that although southern deficits 
essentially corresponded to northern surpluses, the weight of adjustment fell mostly on MMEs, 
with serious social consequences and deepening the recession and the peripheric nature of 
southern European countries even more (De Grauwe & Ji, 2014; Gambarotto & Solari, 2015; 




The EU’s adjustment strategy materialized throught the reinforcement of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, with the introduction of the fiscal compact, the six pack and the two pack. This 
meant a growing transfer of competences to the European Comission, especially regarding the 
monitoring of fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances (Falkner, 2016). However, given the deep 
impact of adjustment on the structure of the economies of the South and the resurgence of 
nationalist and populist parties all over Europe, there are now concerns regarding the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy to force these types of reforms on sovereign States (Höpner & Schäfer, 
2010; Scharpf, 2015; Falkner, 2016). 
The structural reforms enforced by the EU aimed essentially at transforming the 
economic structure of southern economies, trying to bring them closer to the northern European 
model (Hall, 2014; Scharpf, 2016; Hall, 2018). This translated into an attempt at transforming 
their growth model into an export-led growth regime, reinforcing their exports and reducing their 
imports (Felke & Eide, 2014; Vermeiren, 2017). The reforms were also an attempt at transforming 
Southern MMEs into LMEs like the United Kingdom, and not CMEs like Germany, since 
southern countries lack the institutional structure that allows Germany to keep its export 
competitiveness. This resulted in a reduction of trade unions’ power and of labor protection in the 
South, as well as a wave of privatizations (Hall, 2018). 
But changing a country’s economic structure is a very difficult and painful process 
because its institutional design tends to reinforce its growth model, and vice-versa. So, it is only 
natural that there are concerns regarding the reforms’ success and desirability, considering the 
heavy burden they bring onto the population. First, although the reforms were successful in 
liberalizing labor relations, their success at reorienting southern economies towards exports is 
doubtful. Although there was in fact and increase in exports in southern countries, austerity had 
an even greater impact on domestic demand. The export sector is thus still relatively small, 
especially in Greece (Vermeiren, 2017). Excessive concerns about ULCs also caused Southern 
exports to become even more dependent on price competitiveness, as there was no transition to 
more complex and higher quality products (Simonazzi et al, 2013; Kohler & Stockhammer, 2020). 




to accommodate the surpluses of export-led countries. This is why the export-led growth strategy 
is often referred to as “beggar-thy-neighbor” (Johnston & Regan, 2018; Kohler & Stockhammer, 
2020). The solution to this problem has been to reorient southern exports to markets outside the 
EU (Felke & Eide, 2014), leaving these countries more vulnerable to appreciations of the euro 
(Steinberg & Vermeiren, 2016). 
Not all countries have the institutional structure necessary to successfully follow a growth 
strategy based on exports, meaning that the model that currently exists in southern Europe is 
highly unstable. If, on one hand, we can assume that the South has become export-led (Hein, 
2019), it is also possible in turn to identify a debt- and austerity-driven depression model (Kohler 
& Stockhammer, 2020), considering the serious depression that austerity forced onto these 
countries. We thus risk the perpetuation of “growth models without growth” in the EZ (Hall, 
2018), a situation that can condemn the periphery to many years, or even decades, of weak 
economic growth (or near stagnation), hindering real convergence to central and northern 
Europe’s level of development (Johnson  & Papageorgiou, 2020). 
2.4. The new reform of the Eurozone 
The euro crisis has laid bare the need to reform the EZ in order to make it more resistant to 
future crises, making not only southern countries but also northern Europe bear the weight of 
adjustment, contrary to what happened during the 2010/2013 crisis. Recovery based on internal 
devaluation is seen by many authors as insufficient and harmful, and many find that it is preferable 
to follow a strategy based not only on the reinforcement of southern competitiveness, but also on 
the promotion of internal revaluation in countries like Germany, in order to boost domestic 
demand and reduce surpluses there (Simonazzi et al, 2013; Johnston & Regan, 2015; Parker & 
Tsarouhas, 2018). 
However, over the last few years Germany has accumulated ever bigger surpluses and 
the response to the crisis has been framed by the principles of German ordoliberalism, so it is very 
unlikely that a solution that threatens this scenario will ever be adopted (Steinberg & Vermeiren, 




There are many concrete proposals to reform the EZ, aiming at providing the members 
of the EMU with a greater ability to resist future crises in an integrated and cohesive way. First, 
many countries recognize the need to complete the Banking Union, that was created as a response 
to the crisis, but that is yet to be completed. However, the weak consensus surrounding the 
Banking Union doesn’t apply to the rest of the proposals, making it possible to divide EZ members 
into two groups: those that defend a stability union (keeping the current status quo) and those that 
support the deepening of integration through a fiscal union (Hacker & Koch, 2017). This means 
that proposals that could have a relevant impact, such as the creation of an EZ budget, EZ bonds 
and automatic stabilizers like European unemployment benefits, are far from gathering consensus 
(Parker & Tsarouhas, 2018). The desired level of integration varies from country to country, with 
southern countries generally seeking deeper integration and northern countries preferring to 
maintain the status quo. But there are concerns coming from both sides regarding the success to 
these proposals, because many fear that they will result in the creation of a transfers union, with 
the periphery being unable to develop (like the Italian Mezzogiorno) and becoming ever more 
dependent on the core (Scharpf, 2016; Streeck & Elsässer, 2016). 
Structural imbalances in the EZ thus still remain and the debate surrounding the new 
reform has been losing ground to more urgent matters1. It is likely that different varieties of 
capitalism and growth regimes will continue to coexist in the same monetary area in an unstable 
way, translating into weak growth and real divergence, bringing about the conditions to the rise 
of new crises and forcing peripheral countries to bare the weight of adjustment. 
3. Methods and databases 
 The following empirical analysis covers a period spanning from 1995 until the most 
recent available information. This long period has been divided into shorter subperiods for the 
analysis of the contribution of each component to GDP growth and for the sectoral analysis.   
                                                 
1 The sanitary emergency brought about by Covid 19 and the subsequent very serious economic recession 
will be an important test to the future of the Eurozone and of the European Union itself. The joint solidary 
response to this crisis, namely the recovery program with a big transfers component (new generation EU), 
can be decisive for highly indebted peripheral countries, at least in the foreseeable future. But we don’t 
know yet whether this will be enough, in the medium and long run, and whether the strict fiscal frame of 




 Regarding growth regimes, the contribution of each component to GDP growth in each 
time period corresponds to the weight of that component’s variation over GDP variation. This 
means, for example, that the contribution of private consumption (C) to GDP (Y) growth in 1995-
2001 can be written as follows:   
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐶 =
(𝐶2001 −  𝐶1995)
(𝑌2001 −  𝑌1995)
 
For the analysis of product specialization in both countries we used the Krugman 
Specialization Index (K), measuring the distance between a region’s productive structure and the 
productive structure of the reference region (European Central Bank, 2004). The calculations 
were performed for 38 sectors, using total employment and gross value added (GVA). The index 
is computed as follows: 




In this case, 𝑏𝑖 corresponds to the ratio employment/GVA in sector i over the ratio total 
employment/GVA in Portugal and ?̅?𝑖 corresponds to the same measure in Germany.  The index 
can take values between 0 and 2: lower values reflect similar productive structures in the two 
countries and higher values reflect a very different product specialization in the two countries. 





The variables concerning VoC were obtained using multiple databases. ICTWSS 
(Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and 
Social Pacts), version 6.1 of November 2019, drawn up by the Amsterdam Institute of Advanced 
Labour Studies of the University of Amsterdam, provided information on the following variables: 
trade union density, wage bargaining coverage, type of wage bargaining coordination, State 
intervention in wage bargaining and sectoral organization of industrial relations. From Eurostat’s 




vocational training. Lastly, from OECD.Stat, OECD’s database, we obtained data relating to the 
strictness of employment protection. 
In the section about growth regimes, the following variables related to foreign trade (all 
at current prices) were extracted from AMECO (Annual Macro-economic Database of the 
European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs): GDP, exports 
of goods and services and imports of goods and services. The following variables related to the 
contribution of the many components to GDP growth were also obtained from AMECO (all at 
constant prices): GDP, private consumption, investment, public consumption, exports and 
imports. The decomposition of the Balance of Payments (current account, capital account and 
financial account), the decomposition of the current account (balance of goods, balance of 
services, primary income and secondary income) and data concerning the net international 
investment position were all obtained from the Balance of Payments statistics of Banco de 
Portugal, for the Portuguese case, and of the Bundesbank, for the German case. Macroeconomic 
convergence was calculated using GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Parity, also obtained in 
AMECO. 
Lastly, in the section about product specialization, the information about the Economic 
Complexity Index was obtained from the Observatory of Economic Complexity, an online data 
viewing tool about international trade, developed by the Macro Connections group at the MIT 
Media Lab. The Krugman Specialization Index and sectoral convergence were computed using 
GVA at current prices and total employment, extracted from INE (Instituto Nacional de 
Estatística), for the Portuguese case, and from Eurostat, for the German case.  
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Varieties of Capitalism 
 Although the German model is viewed by many as the most successful in the EZ, southern 
countries don’t possess the institutional structure that allows Germany to contain ULCs and 
specialize in quality differentiated and high technology goods, promoting its success as an 
exporting country. For this reason, the EU response to the crisis in Southern MMEs focused 




at transforming these economies into LMEs, and not CMEs. These pressures were reinforced with 
the 2010/2013 crisis, but the liberalization process is an old and relatively generalized trend, 
encompassing not only southern countries, but also the CMEs of northern Europe. 
 It is therefore necessary to assess whether the Portuguese economic structure transitioned 
towards a purer variety of capitalism after the EZ crisis, that is, a LME, which is apparently better 
capable of facing crises than southern MMEs. However, it is also important to evaluate whether 
this generalized trend towards liberalization has affected Germany, the model economy of the EZ 
and the typical example of a CME. It will then be possible to assess whether the institutional 
structure of both countries has become closer in recent years. 
 First, both Germany and Portugal have seen their unionization rates decrease since the 
second half of the 1990s. Starting from similar and already somewhat reduced levels in 1995, 
unionization rates are currently at historically low levels in both countries. This might not be very 
surprising for a MME like Portugal, where trade unions are traditionally strong but very partisan 
and fragmented, but it means a relevant change for a CME like Germany. 
 Regarding collective negotiation, the tendency for liberalization is more apparent in 
Germany than in Portugal. Showing a clear downward tendency over time, the percentage of 
workers covered by collective bargaining in Germany is currently much lower than in 1995, 
having gone from about 81% to 56% in 2016. On the other hand, Portugal recorded periods of 
rising and lowering collective negotiation levels since the second half of the 1990s, showing a 
much less marked tendency for liberalization: the country went from about 78% of workers 
covered by collective bargaining in 1995, to about 74% in 2016 (Table 1). 
Table 1 – Collective bargaining coverage rate (as a % of employed paid workers with a right to 
bargain) 
  1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 
DEU 80,8 67,8 64,9 59,8 56,8 56,0 
PRT 77,5 78,4 83,2 76,7 73,6 73,9 
      Source: ICTWSS, version 6.1 
Although the evolution of union density and collective bargaining coverage might show 




more or less unchanged in both countries. As is shown in Table 2, the high level of wage 
bargaining coordination that existed in Germany in the 1990s, a typical feature of a CME, has 
endured until now, regardless of the 2010/2013 crisis. Through pattern bargaining, strong trade 
unions and employers’ associations seek to extend collective agreements to other negotiation 
processes and, in this way, to achieve cross-sector coordination and wage restraint. This type of 
coordination does not exist in Portugal, which has seen a higher level of government intervention 
in wage setting in areas like public sector wages and minimum wage since 2010. This type of 
government intervention in the labor market, along with the institutional weakness of trade unions 
and employers’ associations, are a typical feature of a MME (Molina & Rhodes, 2007).  
Table 2 – Type of wage bargaining coordination 
  1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 2017 
DEU 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 
PRT 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 
        1-Government signals (public sector wages, minimum wage)  
        2-Pattern bargaining 
        3-Intra-sectoral negotiation (informal centralization)  
        Source: ICTWSS, version 6.1      
The tendency towards liberalization seems to be absent in vocational training. Both in 
LMEs and MMEs there isn’t a big investment in continuous vocational training of workers within 
the company, contrary to what happens in CMEs. For this reason, workers tend to have general 
and low-specialization skills in LMEs and MMEs, and very industry-specific skills in CMEs  
(Hall & Soskice, 2001). It is then only natural that there has been a reinforcement of continuous 
vocational training in Germany since 2005 (Table 3). But Portugal has also seen an improvement 
in workers’ specific skills. In 2005, about 44% of Portuguese companies provided continuous 
vocational training; in 2015, this number had evolved to 75%, a number very close to the German 
level (about 77%).  
Table 3 – Companies providing vocational training (as a % of all companies) 
 DEU PRT 
2005 69,5 44,1 
2010 72,8 64,6 
2015 77,3 75,0 




Finally, the evolution of social protection and employment stability reveals a 
liberalization trend much more evident in Portugal than in Germany and reflects the profound 
impact of the 2010/2013 crisis on the Portuguese economy. In 2013, Germany showed the same 
level of employment protection it had in 1995, measured in terms of the costs of the dismissal of 
workers. On the other hand, Portugal registered a clear deterioration of employment protection 
during the crisis, as both individual and collective dismissals became easier. Besides, the 
percentage of workers with temporary employment contracts in Portugal was almost three times 
higher in 2018 than in 1995. In 1995 this percentage was lower than in Germany, but in 2018 it 
was almost twice the German number. Germany in turn registered only a small increase in this 
type of contracts in the same period. 
Although the tendency for liberalization is evident in both countries, the 2010/2013 crisis 
had a greater impact in Portugal, especially regarding employment protection and stability. But it 
is not yet possible to say that Portugal has become a LME, since the country still shows the typical 
features of a MME, e.g. a high level of government intervention in the labor market. Despite 
generalized pressures towards liberalization and the evolution of both economies in the same 
direction, Portugal and Germany are not much closer at an institutional level now than they were 
before the crisis. This goes in line with the notion that an economy’s institutional structure tends 
to endure over time, and it is very difficult to significantly change it. 
4.2.  Growth models and macroeconomic convergence 
The response to the crisis in southern Europe focused not only on the liberalization of the 
labor market, but also the promotion of an export-led growth strategy according to the German 
model. It is thus relevant to observe whether the export-led growth model was reinforced in 
Germany after the 2010/2013 crisis, and whether there was a shift from a debt-based demand-led 
growth model to a growth strategy based on exports in Portugal. 
4.2.1 – Foreign trade and the Balance of Payments 
 Since the early 2000s, the German economy has been much more open to foreign trade 
than the Portuguese economy, that is, the weight of foreign trade (exports and imports) on GDP 




original EZ members plus Greece (EZ12), while in Portugal the contrary is true. However, in the 
post-crisis period the two countries have become closer due to an increase in the degree of 
openness of the Portuguese economy. 
 Since 1995, both the EZ12 and Germany have recorded a coverage rate of imports by 
exports over 100%, which means both regions hold a strong competitive position. But Portugal 
always registered a coverage rate below 100% during this period, reflecting a weak competitive 
position. This trend ended in 2013, with Portugal recording a coverage rate above 100% since 
then, although still below the German and EZ12 levels. 
 As is shown in Figure 1, the balance of goods and services is very different in Germany 
and in Portugal throughout the period analyzed. The German balance of goods and services has 
never run a deficit since the second half of the 1990s, showing quick improvement in the early 
2000s and recording surpluses above 4,5% of GDP since then, even during the international 
financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent EZ crisis. This clearly reflects the country’s growth 
strategy based on exports. On the other hand, Portugal’s net exports have always been negative 
since 1995, reaching values under -10% of GDP at the turn of the millennium. This trend was 
only reversed in the post-crisis period, with Portugal registering a slight surplus in the balance of 
goods and services since 2012, which is a sign of the European strategy’s focus on the correction 
of external imbalances in deficit countries.  
Figure 1 – Net exports as a % of GDP 
 












































































































Figure 2 – Germany: Decomposition of the balance of goods and services as a % of GDP 
 









         Source: Balance of Payments’ Statistics of the Bundesbank 
 
Although the recovery of Portuguese net exports after the crisis has brought the country 
closer to the German position, this doesn’t mean that Portugal is now following a strategy in all 
similar to that of Germany. As Figure 2 shows, Germany’s success is based on a positive balance 
of goods, that since 2002 has always remained above 2% of GDP, while the German balance of 
services has always run a deficit since the second half of the 1990s. 
The Portuguese balance of goods and services shows an opposite trend, as seen in Figure 










               
             Source: Banco de Portugal 
Figure 3 – Portugal: Decomposition of the balance of goods and services 
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Despite the slight reduction of the balance of goods deficit in 2011, the true fuel for 
Portuguese recovery has been the balance of services, which more than doubled between 2010 
and 2019. The balance of goods and services recovery thus came mainly as a result of growing 
exports of services and not exports of goods, unlike in the German case. 
Regarding the Balance of Payments, Portugal and Germany show opposite trends over 
time. Germany had a slightly positive financial account and a slightly negative current account 
until 2001, when it quickly reversed this situation. Since then, the country consistently records a 
negative financial account and a current account surplus over 4% of GDP. By looking at the 
German current account in detail, it is easy to confirm that its quick recovery in the early 2000s 
was due to an improvement in the balance of goods and in the primary income, which was made 
possible by the growing profits of German multinationals abroad (an advantage that doesn’t exist 
in Portugal). 
On the other hand, Portugal has always registered current account deficits and financial 
account surpluses, until it inverted this trend in 2013. The recovery of the Portuguese current 
account after the crisis was due to a slight recovery in the balance of goods and a sharp 
improvement in the balance of services, with primary income staying negative and secondary 
income growing slightly due to emigrants’ remittances.  
Lastly, the state of the current and financial accounts translates into the evolution of 
external debt, an important indicator for a country’s sustainability that is measured, in this case, 
through the net international investment position (IIP). As is shown in Figure 4, beginning at a 
similar level, since 2004 the German IIP started to improve progressively. However, the 
Portuguese IIP was already in a trajectory of rapid deterioration since the second half of the 1990s, 
sinking to about -124% of GDP in 2014. After de EZ crisis, the situation began to stabilize in 
Portugal, which currently shows a slight improvement in its IIP (it was about -101% of GDP in 
2019). Germany’s IIP has in turn maintained its upward tendency, having reached 71% of GDP 





     Figure 4 – Net international investment position as a % of GDP 
 
      Source: Balance of Payment statistics of Banco de Portugal and the Bundesbank 
4.2.2. Economic growth and the contributions of the components of GDP 
Looking at the average annual growth rate (AAGR) of GDP in both countries, as well as 
in the EZ12, it is possible to observe four distinct periods. Between 1995 and 2001 there was an 
expansion period, with accelerated growth in the three regions, especially in Portugal. A 
stagnation period followed in 2001-2008, with all the regions recording little GDP growth 
(especially Portugal). The 2008-2013 period corresponds to the two big crises: the international 
financial crisis of 2008/2009 and the subsequent EZ crisis. Both Portugal and the EZ12 showed 
negative AAGR of GDP in that period, while Germany was able to maintain a slight GDP growth. 
The period that followed (2013-2019) was a time of recovery, with the three regions showing 
AAGR of GDP around 2%. 
 Before the crises period, domestic demand (DD), composed of private consumption (C), 
public consumption (G) and investment (I), had a very important contribution to Portuguese GDP 
growth, unlike the balance of goods and services (NX), comprising exports (EX) minus imports 
(IM). Private consumption contribution to GDP growth was about 99% during the stagnation 
period, almost matching the contribution of exports in that same period (Figure 5). However, in 
2008-2013 the situation was reversed and the balance of goods and services became the fuel for 
Portuguese GDP growth, due to a dramatic decrease in imports, leading their contribution to 











































































































growth during this time, mainly due to the negative contributions of private consumption (about 
-81%) and investment (about -108%). This fall in consumption and investment reflected the 
profound impact of the European strategy of crisis management on a demand-led country like 
Portugal. During the period of recovery, the situation reversed almost entirely to the pre-crisis 
scenario. However, the contributions of private and public consumption remain below the 2001-
2008 levels and exports still provide the main positive contribution to GDP growth. 
Figure 5 – Portugal: The contribution of the components of GDP to GDP growth (as %)  
 
      Source: AMECO and own calculations 
It is thus possible to identify an export-led type of growth in Portugal during the crisis 
period. However, since the AAGR of GDP was negative in that period, it is difficult to speak of 
a truly successful export-led strategy in Portugal (Kohler & Stockhammer, 2020). In the recovery 
period the situation became less clear, with Portugal reversing to the pre-crisis scenario, calling 
into question the success of the export-led growth model in the country once again. This 
transitional scenario in the recovery period, when Portugal recorded a slight current account 
surplus but a negative contribution of net exports, can be defined as a weakly export-led growth 
model, arising due to a decrease in the country’s competitiveness (Hein & Mundt, 2013). 
The evolution of the situation in the EZ12 is more similar to that of Portugal than 
Germany, but the contribution of private consumption was never as important as in Portugal and 
the contribution of the balance of goods and services was always more relevant to the EZ12 than 
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model during the crisis (although the region as a whole also registered negative AAGR of GDP 
during this time) and then reverted back to the pre-crisis situation during the recovery period. 
The scenario in Germany is very different. Figure 6 clearly shows Germany’s strong bet 
on exports, that always provided the main contribution to the country’s GDP growth. During the 
stagnation period, the contribution of NX to GDP growth was even higher than the contribution 
of domestic demand. In the crises period there was a slight change: Germany’s expansionary 
efforts translated into an increase in the contribution of private consumption and public spending, 
as the country focused on the domestic market to fight the crisis and compensate for the decrease 
in world trade. In the recovery period the negative contribution of imports was even slightly 
higher than the contribution of exports, but there was also a deep reduction in public spending 
(about half the contribution of the previous period) and private consumption (about half the 
contribution of exports). Considering that in 2013-2019 exports still represented by far the biggest 
positive contribution to German GDP and that the country recorded a significant current account 
surplus in that time, and bearing in mind the reduction in the contribution of private consumption, 
Germany appears to have kept its export-led growth model after the crises. 
         Figure 6 – Germany: The contribution of the components of GDP to GDP growth (as  %) 
 







      
  
  
     Source: AMECO and own calculations 
 
 In conclusion, the two countries are now closer than before the crisis, given Portugal’s 
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private consumption in Germany. However, both countries seem to be reverting to their pre-crisis 
situations. 
4.2.3 – Macroeconomic convergence 
 Following the analysis of macroeconomic growth, it is also relevant to look into real 
convergence between the Portuguese and German economies, that is, whether Portuguese GDP 
per capita has become closer to the German level. 
 According to the evolution of both countries’ AAGR of GDP per capita in Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) , as seen in Table 4, Portugal had always grown faster than Germany until the 
crises period, converging to the German level even during the first decade of the euro. However, 
during the crises Portugal began to diverge from Germany’s level of development, recording 
negative growth (although Germany’s growth also slowed down considerably). After the crises, 
both economies clearly recovered, with Portugal resuming the process of real convergence. 
Table 4 – Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Parity (as %) 
 1995-2001 2001-2008 2008-2013 2013-2017 
DEU 1,30 1,31 0,86 1,47 
PRT 3,23 1,57 -1,35 2,06 
          Source: AMECO and own calculations 
The evolution of relative GDP per capita in PPP (Table 5) offers similar conclusions. 
Until the time of the crises there was real convergence, with Portuguese GDP per capita in PPP 
becoming almost 70% of the German level in 2008. But convergence during the pre-crisis period 
was much lower than what had been expected as a result of monetary integration (Banco Central 
Europeu, 2015). In the crises period, Portugal began diverging from Germany, until in 2017 the 
country was below the 2001 level in relative terms, with its GDP per capita in PPP representing 
only about 64% of that of Germany. 
Table 5 – Relative GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Parity (as %) 
1995 2001 2008 2013 2017 
60,86 68,13 69,38 62,09 64,26 




It is then clear the deep impact that the crises and the European response had on the 
Portuguese economy, perpetuating a scenario of little convergence to the German level of 
development since the second half of the 1990s. 
4.3 – Sectoral analysis of the productive structure 
4.3.1 – Technology and knowledge 
Although Portugal is currently closer to the German model, the EZ crisis did not lead to 
a reorientation of Portuguese exports of goods to more technology-intensive sectors, as the 
evolution of the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) shows. The ECI measures the relative 
knowledge intensity of a given economy considering the knowledge intensity of the products it 
exports. 
Starting from a point far below Germany in 1995, Portugal’s ECI improved progressively 
until the second half of the 2000s, when it began to stagnate (see Table 6). Germany has in turn 
registered a more or less stable ECI since 1995, with its 2018 level being exactly the same as in 
1995, although much higher than in Portugal. 
Turning to the composition of both countries’ exports of goods, there are important 
differences. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity, Portugal’s main exports of 
goods in 2018 were cars (6,02%), vehicle parts (4,94%), refined petroleum (3,98%), leather 
footwear (6,02%) and uncoated paper (2%). On the other hand, in 2018 Germany was mainly 
exporting motor cars (10,3%), vehicle parts (4,53%), packaged medicaments (3,71%), planes, 
helicopters and spacecrafts (2,06%) and blood, antisera, vaccines, toxins and cultures (1,96%). 
This means that Portugal still specializes in the export of goods with a lower technology content 
than Germany.  
Table 6 – Economic Complexity Index 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 2017 2018 
DEU 1,89 1,94 2,01 1,93 1,89 1,89 1,91 1,89 
PRT 0,13 0,18 0,38 0,48 0,48 0,49 0,45 0,50 
Classification according to the Harmonized System (HS92) with a depth of 6 digits  




  According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity’s ECI ranking, in 2018 Germany 
was the fourth most complex economy out of a total of 138 countries (it placed third in 1995), 
while Portugal occupied the 48th position (it placed 46th in 1995). Given the stagnation of 
Portugal’s ECI at a relatively low level, the distance between Portugal and Germany regarding 
the complexity of the goods they export has remained almost unchanged since the 1990s. 
4.3.2 – Product specialization 
 Despite the differences in the composition of their respective balances of goods and 
services and although the Portuguese economy has retained a low level of complexity over time, 
Portugal and Germany are currently closer in many aspects, as has already been discussed. It is 
therefore important to look at the productive specialization of both countries, in order to assess 
whether their productive structures are now more similar than in 1995. 
 According to the Krugman Specialization Index, based on total employment (Table 7), 
product specializations are similar, since K has taken values close to 0 since 1995. The distance 
between the two countries increased slightly between 1995 and 2001 and decreased markedly in 
the post-crisis period. In 2017 the two countries were significantly more similar in their product 
specialization than in 1995. 
Table 7 – Krugman Specialization Index (employment)  
 1995 2001 2008 2013 2017 
K 0,48 0,50 0,46 0,41 0,38 
         Source: INE and Eurostat 
Basing the analysis on GVA instead of total employment allows for similar conclusions 
(Table 8). Although the evolution is not as glaring, when using GVA as a variable both countries 
are still closer after the crisis than in the late 1990s. 
Table 8 – Krugman Specialization Index (GVA) 
 1995 2001 2008 2013 2017 
K 0,45 0,48 0,47 0,43 0,42 
Source: INE and Eurostat 
4.3.3 – Sectoral convergence  
 
 Seeing as Portugal’s product specialization is currently more similar to that of Germany 




between the two countries. That is, to check whether productivity in most sectors of the 
Portuguese economy has been converging to German levels. 
 The 38 Portuguese sectors as a whole converged to the German level until 2013, even 
during the crisis, and only began to diverge in the recovery period (Table 9). Portuguese sectoral 
productivity went from around 37% of the German level in 1995 to about 56% in 2013, falling 
slightly to around 54% in 2017. This seems to contrast with the process of macroeconomic 
convergence, as the Portuguese economy began diverging from Germany earlier in 2008, 
resuming the process of convergence after the crisis. However, while macroeconomic 
convergence deals with GDP per capita, sectoral convergence is based on GVA per worker, so it 
is possible that sectoral convergence during the crises years was due not to an increase in GVA, 
but to a sharp decrease in employment2. 
Table 9 – Selected industries: Average annual growth rate of sectoral productivity (as %) 
1995-2001 2001-2008 2008-2013 2013-2017 
 PRT DEU PRT DEU PRT DEU PRT DEU 
Food and tobacco 8,47 -1,12 4,14 -0,06 3,13 2,23 1,84 3,08 
Textiles 2,95 2,11 4,02 3,54 4,59 2,23 1,84 3,41 
Wood and paper 4,98 1,26 2,80 0,74 3,71 1,51 2,02 2,39 
Chemical products 1,21 1,69 2,82 2,42 2,97 1,09 5,32 4,58 
Rubber and plastics 4,47 -0,50 3,01 2,22 3,06 1,74 2,27 2,79 
Metals 3,25 2,00 5,16 3,43 0,18 0,17 3,73 1,59 
IT equipment 4,07 2,95 2,45 3,28 -6,54 0,52 0,88 3,73 
Electrical equipment 5,43 -0,15 5,55 3,58 -1,75 1,83 0,58 3,22 
Machinery 8,11 2,53 4,09 3,90 3,20 0,16 0,62 3,26 
Transport equipment 13,88 2,26 0,82 2,84 4,06 5,59 -0,04 6,98 
Total 38 sectors 5,00 0,74 4,09 1,87 1,83 1,26 1,21 2,56 
 Source: INE, Eurostat and own calculations  
According to the AAGR of productivity in 9 selected industries, the industrial sector 
appears to have followed the general trend, converging until 2013 and beginning to diverge from 
Germany in the post-crisis period. But some sectors were already diverging in 2008-2013, as is 
the case of IT equipment, electrical equipment and transport equipment. 
                                                 
2 These differences between the relative evolution of GDP per capita and that of labor productivity raise 




The evolution of relative sectoral productivity allows for similar conclusions: most 
sectors converged to the German level until 2013, even during the crises period with the exception 
of the previously mentioned sectors (Table 10).  
Table 10 – Selected industries: Relative sectoral productivity (as %) 
  1995 2001 2008 2013 2017 
Food and tobacco 31,99 55,74 74,37 77,68 74,02 
Textiles 31,24 32,81 33,88 37,98 35,73 
Wood and paper 43,89 54,50 62,81 69,91 68,92 
Chemical products 46,33 45,04 46,28 50,75 52,20 
Rubber and plastics 39,54 52,95 55,91 59,63 58,43 
Metals 35,92 38,65 43,41 43,44 47,21 
IT equipment 62,36 66,55 62,91 43,71 39,09 
Electrical equipment 32,23 44,66 50,95 42,59 38,41 
Machinery 28,70 39,45 39,95 46,38 41,82 
Transport equipment 20,43 38,97 33,91 31,51 24,01 
Total 38 sectors 36,78 47,15 54,83 56,39 53,48 
 Source: INE, Eurostat and own sectors 
 
Lastly, the evolution of the productivity of services that represent costs to businesses also 
deserves a brief overview. Both the transport and the water and sewage sectors have converged 
to the German level since 1995, always growing faster than their German counterparts until 2013 
(Table 11). However, the water and sewage sector began to diverge in 2013, representing in 2017 
only 37% of German productivity in the same sector, a number that is lower than the one recorded 
in 2008 (Table 12). The electricity and gas sector shows a positive trend, being much more 
productive in Portugal (it represented about double the German productivity in 2017)3. Lastly, the 
telecommunications sector shows a rather unique evolution: with a higher productivity than the 
German sector since 1995, in 2008 the Portuguese sector began to diverge, registering negative 
AAGR until it sunk to about 68% of German productivity in 2017. 
Table 11 – Selected services: Average annual growth rate of sectoral productivity (as %) 
1995-2001 2001-2008 2008-2013 2013-2017 
 PRT DEU PRT DEU PRT DEU PRT DEU 
Eletricity and gas 6,30 3,78 8,29 8,81 7,20 -2,17 3,09 0,80 
Water and sewage 8,99 0,65 7,86 3,86 3,19 0,93 -2,39 3,18 
Transport 5,62 3,07 3,71 2,89 2,46 0,88 1,38 0,42 
                                                 
3 It would be interesting to assess whether this sector’s good relative performance in Portugal is due to real 




Telecommunications 9,06 6,24 3,43 1,75 -6,67 2,72 -2,84 4,35 
Total 38 sectors 5,00 0,74 4,09 1,87 1,83 1,26 1,21 2,56 
Source: INE, Eurostat and own calculations 
 
Table 12 – Selected services: Relative sectoral productivity (as %) 
 1995 2001 2008 2013 2017 
Electricity and gas 123,41 142,49 137,81 217,74 238,19 
Water and sewage 18,82 30,34 39,53 44,16 35,37 
Transport 62,14 71,97 76,08 82,20 85,37 
Telecommunications 111,59 130,54 146,49 90,71 68,16 
Total 38 sectors 36,78 47,15 54,83 56,39 53,48 
Source: INE, Eurostat and own calculations 
 
5. Conclusion 
 In this paper we tried to assess whether the Portuguese economy has become closer to the 
German economy after the 2010/2013 crisis and what that means for the process of real 
convergence and the cohesion of the Eurozone.  
Despite being quite rigid, the structure of the labor market has been evolving towards 
liberalization in both countries, especially regarding employment protection and stability in 
Portugal. This comes as a consequence of the attempt at correcting imbalances in the Portuguese 
economy by turning it into a LME, and not a CME like Germany. However, over time both 
countries have kept most of the typical features of their specific variety of capitalism, confirming 
the resistance and durability of an economy’s institutional structure.  
The biggest changes after the crisis are related to the countries’ growth regimes. It is clear 
that there has been an attempt at transforming the Portuguese economy into an export-led 
economy according to the German model. But considering the features of Portuguese growth 
during the crises years (mostly based on exports of services and greatly impaired by the decrease 
in domestic demand) as well as the fact that the country appears to be reverting to a scenario 
similar to the pre-crises years, the success of the export-led model in Portugal seems questionable. 
Furthermore, after a period of consistent convergence to the German level of development before 
the crisis, Portugal began to diverge from Germany in 2008, and only resumed the convergence 




Although their export growth is based on different strategies, Portugal and Germany are 
now closer in what concerns their product specialization than they were before the crisis. 
Furthermore, average productivity of the many sectors of the Portuguese economy converged to 
the German level until 2013, when they began to diverge slightly. However, the fact that the two 
countries are now closer hasn’t translated into a significative increase in the complexity of 
Portuguese exports.  
To sum up, it is possible to say that Portugal and Germany are now closer than in the 
second half of the 1990s, and that this was mainly due to the euro crisis. But significant differences 
remain, and the trend is now for both economies to return to the pre-crisis situation.  
The effects of the 2010/2013 crisis and of the EZ response have been evident throughout 
the entire analysis. With the reform the Eurozone’s economic governance now losing ground to 
more urgent matters, and bearing in mind both countries’ tendency to return to the growth model 
typically associated with their variety of capitalism over the last few years, the question of the 
sustainability of the Eurozone and its ability to survive future crises becomes inevitable.  
Finally, it is worth noting that this work provides only a wide overview of the structures 
of Portuguese and German economies, and it would be very interesting and useful to compare 
each one of its several aspects in more depth.  
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